// Security Advisory Triage
Python tarfile, zipfile, gzip CLIs allow code execution via stdlib shadowing
Python security announcements · published 2026-11-13 19:46 UTC
WHAT CHANGEDCVE-2026-115791 discloses that when tarfile, zipfile or gzip command line interfaces decompress an archive, a malicious archive can place a Python script (especially traceback.py) in the current directory. If decompression of a subsequent file errors, Python executes the attacker's script instead of the stdlib module because sys.path[0] includes the current directory. The fix removes sys.path[0] from these three CLI tools. Severity: MEDIUM.
WHY IT MATTERSAny script or automation that uses `python -m tarfile`, `python -m zipfile`, or `python -m gzip` to extract untrusted archives can execute arbitrary code from the archive contents. The attack succeeds when any file after the malicious script triggers a decompression error, making exploitation straightforward.
WHAT TO DOCheck whether any automation, CI pipelines, or deployment scripts use `python -m tarfile`, `python -m zipfile`, or `python -m gzip` to extract archives. If so, verify exposure against the affected versions listed at https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-115791 and apply the patched CPython release.
Model-reported confidence 85% (not measured accuracy)
Primary source ↗
written by anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5
Show the reasoning — raw diff, triage verdict, confidence
RAW DIFF
+## [Security-announce][CVE-2026-115791] Prevent shadowing stdlib in gzip/tarfile/zipfile CLI +https://mail.python.org/archives/list/security-announce@python.org/message/ZKKA4Q7B35JEHSDIJNZ6TYKRDQJUHDAG/ +Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:00:26 +0000 + +There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython. + +When tarfile or zipfile command line interface (CLI) is used to +decompress an archive, a Python script shadowing the stdlib can be +created. Then if an error occurs during decompressing the next file, +the newly created Python script is executed. This is especially true +if the created Python is called traceback.py. The problem is that +Python adds the current directory to sys.path when python -m MODULE is +run, and the archive is also decompressed in the current directory. + +The fix removes sys.path[0] in gzip, tarfile and zipfile command line +interface to prevent shadowing standard library modules from extracted +files. + +Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions: + +* https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-115791 +* https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/161705
HOW IT WAS JUDGED
Triage signals below are model-reported assertions, preserved verbatim; they are not independent arithmetic verification.
| triage verdict | MATERIAL at 0.92, needed 0.5 |
|---|---|
| triage reasoning | CPython stdlib CLI vulnerability enabling arbitrary code execution during archive decompression. Python runtime is infrastructure-critical. |
| signals | affects Python runtime (CPython) · affects CLI tools in standard library (tarfile, zipfile, gzip) · arbitrary code execution via sys.path shadowing · Python is in dependency tree of normal services · MEDIUM severity with clear exploitation path |
| suppression | — |
| triage model | anthropic/claude-haiku-4.5 ($0.00000) |
| writer model | anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5 ($0.00000) |